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ABSTRACT
THE REAL AMBASSADORS:
A MUSICAL ON JAZZ DIPLOMACY AND RACE RELATIONS DURING
THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS
by
Treshani Perera

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Gillian Rodger
This Master’s thesis examines jazz diplomacy and race relations in the United States
during the early Cold War years, the U.S. State Department’s cultural diplomacy propaganda
initiatives, and narratives of musicians featured in State Department jazz tours as reflected in the
musical The Real Ambassadors. The musical was written by Iola and Dave Brubeck following their
State Department jazz tour of Europe, Asia and the Middle East in 1958. The debut performance
took place at the 1962 Monterey Jazz Festival, featuring Louis Armstrong in the lead role. A
textural analysis of songs from the musical will be considered for in-depth coverage of musicians’
narrative and experience with locals during jazz diplomacy tours. A thorough understanding of
American cultural and racial history during the early Cold War years is also crucial for
contextualizing intersections between music and politics in the U.S. during the time period.
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CHAPTER 1
Race Relations, Cultural Diplomacy, and Jazz: Setting the Stage

U.S. cultural programming during the Cold War represented the country’s largest
propaganda effort next to foreign policy and diplomacy. The wide spread of jazz throughout the
world during the early Cold War years helped determine the course of the Cold War and
redefine American foreign diplomacy in some instances. In this cultural Cold War, the Soviet
Union lacked a weapon to counter jazz, making it the most successful tool within “the arsenal of
democracy.”1 The 1950s and 1960s were critical years for U.S. cultural diplomacy to establish its
supremacy, but the rest of the world seemed focused on the hypocrisy behind the prevailing
racial inequality in a country boastful of its freedom and democracy. The Soviet Union was
quick to notice and publicize American politics as segregationist and its culture as “decadent,
amoral, materialistic, and individualistic.”2 As a bold propaganda move in 1956, the State
Department strategically began to highlight jazz, African American musicians and integrated
bands as part of cultural diplomacy. This strategy prompted disapproval from state officials,
both local and abroad, sometimes condemning jazz as a “crude” art. In a memo to Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles on 23 July 1954, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr. advised that only “quality music” such as Western classical art music and ballet
should be represented in the U.S. cultural programs abroad and to “avoid jazz music… at first

1

Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters
(New York: New Press, 1999), 2.
2 Lisa Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy: Race and Culture in the Cold War,” in
African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of Frederick Douglass to the Age of
Obama, edited by Linda Heywood, Allison Blakely, Charles R. Stith, and Joshua C. Yesnowitz
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 142.
1

and later work it in only as a part of a fairly highbrow program.”3 Despite Lodge Jr.’s seeminglyelitist bias, the Eisenhower administration, recognizing jazz’s propaganda power, charged the
State Department and the U.S. Information Agency to actively promulgate jazz as part of
cultural programing.4
The official platform given to jazz was met with resistance by some members in
Congress; Representative John Rooney from New York led the attack with strong support from
Louisiana Senator and Southern segregationist Allen J. Ellender. When Gillespie was chosen and
announced as the first jazz ambassador to tour for the State Department, Ellender opposed the
decision by declaring that Gillespie’s music would reduce the American cultural image to
“barbarians,” but the tour turned out to be one of the most successful official cultural
presentations.5 Gillespie’s band arrived in Greece and played a matinee show for university
students shortly after the stoning of the U.S. field office in Athens. These students were
angered by U.S. support of Greece’s right wing dictatorship, and “the anti-American feeling was
real and intense.”6 Gillespie described the experience as, “They loved us so much that when we
finished playing they tossed their jackets into the air and carried me on their shoulders through

3

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, United States Department of State,
1775.
4 Davenport, “Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 142. More information on U.S. agencies involved in
cultural diplomacy can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
5 Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 40; Reinhold Wagnleitner, “Jazz:
the classical music of globalization,” in Satchmo Meets Amadeus, edited by Reinhold
Wagnleitner (Innsbruck, Germany: Studienverlag. 2006), 295.
6 Von Eschen, 34; Dizzy Gillespie quoted in Ralph Ginzburg, “Jazz is too good for Americans,”
Esquire (June 1957), 55. The field offices were part of the U.S. Information Agency, a
government agency in Washington.
2

the streets of the city.”7 The local newspapers carried a similar sentiment of success with the
headlines “Students Drop Rocks and Roll with Dizzy,” prompting field mission officials to
conclude that jazz was “powerfully effective against Red Propaganda” and for “communicating
with [locals] regardless of language or social barriers.”8 Jazz scholar Marshall W. Stearns, who
accompanied Gillespie on tour, aptly captured the success as,
It has never dawned upon Americans that many people in foreign lands consider
jazz a new and impressive contribution to culture. Jazz was born and grew up in
the United States and nowhere else. As a European composer remarked to me:
“Jazz is one of America's best-loved artistic exports.”9
While jazz musicians were subject to frequent State Department “briefings”, it is important to
acknowledge that they were by no stooges of U.S. foreign policy. Many jazz musicians – both
Black and White - openly shared their views on race and domestic policies with locals, to the
displeasure of government officials. Intentionally or unintentionally, cultural diplomacy tours
depicted “pronounced differences in the aims of artists and government officials,” sometimes
leading to a difference in opinion on what to highlight as values in American culture.10
This thesis examines jazz diplomacy and race relations in the United States during the
early Cold War years, roughly spanning the 1950s and 1960s. While jazz tours counted towards
a small percentage of U.S. cultural programming, their successes were in establishing cultural
relationships with locals, as portrayed in the musical The Real Ambassadors. The musical was
written by Iola and Dave Brubeck following their State Department jazz tour of Europe, Asia,

7

Von Eschen, 34.
Von Eschen, 34; Music Advisory Panel meeting minutes (24 April 1956, 12 June 1956), Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas Fayetteville.
9 Marshall W. Stearns, “Is Jazz Good Propaganda? The Dizzy Gillespie Tour,'' Saturday Review
(July 14, 1956), 31.
10 Wagnleitner, “Jazz: the classical music of globalization,” 296.
8
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and the Middle East in 1958. The debut performance took place at the 1962 Monterey Jazz
Festival, featuring Louis Armstrong, another jazz ambassador, playing himself in the lead role. A
textural analysis of songs from the musical and personal memoirs of Louis Armstrong and the
Brubecks will present an in-depth understanding of musicians’ experiences, observations, and
interactions with locals during jazz diplomacy tours. A thorough understanding of U.S. race
relations and foreign policy during the early Cold War years is also crucial for contextualizing
intersections between music and politics during this time period.
Walter Carrington, in his Preface to African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy, defines
diplomacy as “a duty to speak sometimes unpalatable truths not only to people and
governments to which they are assigned, but also… the expectation that their insights can have
an important impact on the formation of the policies they are expected to carry out.”11 Jazz
musicians such as Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, Dave Brubeck, and others,
were part of the State Department jazz tours that began in the mid-1950s and lasted through
the 1960s with the aim of spreading goodwill and democratic values around the world. Jazz was
portrayed as a unification of freedom and democracy, which later led to the term “Jazzocracy.”
As Mark Laver explains, Jazzocracy refers to the democratic practice in jazz, where
improvisation positions the individual in a “dialectical” relationship with the collective. 12 The
music that is produced is the result of a democratic process representing the interests of the
individual and the collective while celebrating the individual’s freedom of expression.

11

Walter Carrington, Preface to African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of
Frederick Douglass to the Age of Obama, edited by Linda Heywood, Allison Blakely, Charles R.
Stith, and Joshua C. Yesnowitz (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2015), xix.
12 Mark Laver, “Freedom of Choice: Jazz, Neoliberalism, and the Lincoln Center,” Popular
Music and Society 37, no. 5 (2014), 538.
4

When State Department jazz tours commenced in 1956, the focal regions were Asia,
Europe, and the Middle East; eventually Africa and the Soviet Union were added as tour
locations. Emerging and newly-independent countries in Africa and politically-unstable Middle
Eastern countries were specifically targeted as these regions had not firmly allied with either
the United States or the Soviet Union, but were perceived to be threatened by communism.13
Dave Brubeck described his 1958 tour of Eastern Europe and Asia as “a circle around the Soviet
Union,” which aligned with the propaganda framework for U.S. cultural and foreign diplomacy:
to “promote and consolidate American economic and military interests in nations bordering the
Soviet Union,” and generate goodwill between locals and American citizens through cultural
exchange.14 The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), in particular, was interested in presenting a
counter narrative to the Soviet propaganda campaign that was drawing unwanted attention to
segregation and racial tension in the United States.15 In order to portray a picture of racial
equality in practice, nearly all jazz bands on tour featured personnel from both races, or
featured an African American bandleader. Duke Ellington described his encounters with locals
during his 1963 State Department tour of East and South Asia, especially those who were
curious about racial equality in the United States, as: “The big question when they meet an
American Negro is always the race problem, [but] we have all the problems of a free country.”16

13

Ibid., 543.
Stephen Crist, “Jazz as Democracy? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics,” The Journal of
Musicology 26, no.2 (2009), 162; Laver, “Freedom of Choice,” 544.
15 Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World, 11.
16 Ellington quoted in Harvey G. Cohen, “Visions of Freedom: Duke Ellington in the Soviet
Union,” Popular Music 30, no.3 (2011), 306.
14
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Lisa Davenport summarizes the outcome of State Department tours as the jazz
diplomacy paradox, where “racial equality, integration, and American exceptionalism”
sometimes did not align with the realities of racial bias faced by African American jazz
musicians.17 As pianist Quincy Jones, who toured with Dizzy Gillespie in Greece in 1956,
recalled, “It was the state officials who ‘patronizingly’ warned Greek locals to steer clear of the
Black guys.”18
In Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa, ethnomusicologist Ingrid
Monson argues that jazz and its discourse during the Civil Rights Movement had much in
common with the politics of the time.19 Monson maps the changing political, social, and musical
landscape through the perspective of musicians on State Department jazz tours and their
interactions with locals, the media, and domestic audiences to highlight these parallels.
Interviews, archival research, and analysis of recordings and performances reveal how Black
and White performers had starkly different experiences based on race, and how their musical
aesthetics embodied the tensions of the period.
Among scholarship covering jazz diplomacy and cultural exchange during the Cold War
years, the most comprehensive coverage of government records is found in Fosler-Lussier’s
Music in American’s Cold War Diplomacy and Nicholas Cull’s The Cold War and the United
States Information Agency. Both monographs extensively cover the history of U.S. cultural
diplomacy and agencies and strategies set forth by the State Department and the USIA during

17

Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 146.
Quincy Jones, Q: The Autobiography of Quincy Jones (New York, Doubleday, 2001), 112-4.
19 Ingrid Monson, Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
18

6

the Cold War. The website accompanying Fosler-Lussier’s Music in America’s Cold War
Diplomacy presents records from the U.S. Advisory Committee on the Arts (ACA) that
encouraged the promotion of “art of the highest quality” in cultural programming. FoslerLussier’s scholarship also covers deliberations and arguments made by Music Advisory Panel
members against and in support of jazz to be represented in U.S. cultural programming.20 Cull’s
scholarship outlines the history of Cold War broadcasting, U.S. propaganda since the Truman
administration, and a detailed history of the State Department and its agencies (including name
changes!) active during the Cold War.
Lisa Davenport’s dissertation-turned-monograph Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in
the Cold War Era largely focuses on the State Department jazz tours and issues of race
surrounding jazz diplomacy. Davenport’s recurring argument is that the “cultural oppression” of
the nation’s African American minority came to symbolize “the cultural superiority of American
democracy” with the use of jazz in Cultural Presentations.21 Davenport also emphasizes how
policymakers and State Department officials portrayed jazz as an authentic expression of
American life and as a powerful arsenal for the U.S. to win the cultural Cold War against the
Soviet Union.
Penny Von Eschen’s extensive research on the jazz ambassadors program and artist
accounts are reflected in her seminal work Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play
the Cold War. The monograph explores how and why the State Department jazz tours were

20

“A Statement on the Selection of American Art to be Sent Abroad under the Government’s
International Cultural Relations Programs,” Minutes from the Eighth meeting of the Advisory
Committee on the Arts, 25–26 April 1960, box 159, Record Group 59, National Archives.
21 Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 145.
7

successful in disseminating U.S. propaganda through cultural programming. Von Eschen’s
emphasis lies in the role played by African American jazz musicians and integrated bands to
counter international criticism of U.S. racial tension and segregation.
The time period focus of this thesis is approximately from the end of the Second World
War through the 1960s, in order to convey policy and programming decisions made prior to and
during the jazz diplomacy tours. This includes the establishment of Cold War broadcasting that
led to the popularity of American jazz and popular music abroad, important civil rights events
for African Americans, and jazz diplomacy tours that influenced the writing and debut
performance of the musical The Real Ambassadors.
Chapter 2 presents the origins of State Department cultural propaganda and the role
played by jazz and jazz musicians. Much of this chapter covers the history and origins of StateDepartment-led initiatives such as the Voice of America broadcasting service, goodwill
ambassador tours featuring jazz musicians and integrated bands, and correspondence and
reports from State Department officials highlighting the effects of American culture abroad
through jazz diplomacy. The chapter also presents an outline of jazz diplomacy tours from 1956
through the late 1960s, which is when the program was aborted due to budgetary and financial
expenditure.
Chapter 3 covers the state of race relations in the United States during the 1950s by
examining effects of the 1957 Little Rock Crisis on cultural diplomacy. The domestic and
international experiences of African American jazz musicians and integrated bands are
discussed alongside civil rights issues that plagued African Americans at the time. The chapter
also discusses landmark civil rights events that moved jazz musicians to speak up or act against
8

U.S. propaganda, painting a different image of racial unity from what the State Department
sought to convey through propaganda documentation abroad.
Chapter 4 will present a textual analysis of the musical The Real Ambassadors exploring
racial tension and political propaganda, as witnessed by the musical’s creators and
collaborators. The Real Ambassadors, with music by Dave Brubeck and libretto by his wife Iola,
was able to capture the often complicated and sometimes contradictory politics of the State
Department cultural diplomacy tours. The musical was created as a satire of State Department
objectives, personnel, and protocol, and is a representation of “a powerful and unequivocal
indictment of Jim Crow America.”22
Much of scholarship on The Real Ambassadors has discussed and presented the musical
as an aside within jazz diplomacy scholarship. In a performance setting, the musical has not
been performed since the early 2000s, nor has it received its due recognition and spotlight as a
political satire set to music. The purpose of this thesis is to bring to the reader’s attention how
the musical is deeply political, voicing creative dissent against a controlled narrative presented
in state-sponsored cultural propaganda. The Real Ambassadors received much critical acclaim
after its 1962 debut as a jazz musical with its swinging juxtaposition of disparate musical styles.
However, there has been very little scholarship on the significance of the musical’s libretto as a
work of art for social and cultural commentary and criticism of U.S. cultural diplomacy during
the Cold War. The textual analysis will attempt to disclose the satire portrayed throughout the
musical, and expose the state of U.S. cultural diplomacy and race relations during the Cold War.

22

Penny M. Von Eschen, “The Real Ambassadors,” in Satchmo Meets Amadeus, edited by
Reinhold Wagnleitner (Innsbruck, Germany: Studienverlag. 2006), 97.
9

CHAPTER 2
Jazz and State Department Cultural Diplomacy during the 1950s-60s

The State Department has discovered jazz.
It reaches folks like nothing ever has.
No commodity is quite so strange /
As this thing called Cultural Exchange.
Louis Armstrong, The Real Ambassadors
"Cultural Exchange"

Understanding the beginnings of cultural diplomacy in the United States requires
knowledge of Cold War broadcasting and propaganda initiatives set in place during and after
the Second World War. Frances Stonor Saunders defines propaganda during the Cold War as
“organized effort or movement to disseminate information… by means of news, special
arguments, or appeals designed to influence the thoughts and actions of any given group.”23
While the beginning of cultural diplomacy may be traced to the founding of the USIA in 1953,
the first formal structures in American cultural diplomacy were established largely through
radio broadcasting during and after the Second World War. While European nations and the
Soviet Union established official broadcasting services and cultural diplomacy programming
during the Interwar period, the Roosevelt administration focused on the creation of a
presidential “fireside chat” series on radio to promote New Deal programs during that time,
with potential for expanding services to include international broadcasting and cultural
programming using radio services.24 In 1935, the State Department began to transmit the daily

23

Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 4.
Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
10-11. The Soviet Union’s international radio broadcast began in 1927 with the founding of
24

10

Radio Bulletin to foreign mission offices, which eventually led to the creation of the State
Department Division of the Cultural Relations in 1938. The goal of this office was to work in
conjunction with the Secretary of State and begin cultural outreach to Latin American countries
as Europeans and the Soviet Union were slowly approaching same with political propaganda,
but the initiative never took ground.25
With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, President Roosevelt identified the
need to create cultural and political alliances with other nations, and established the Office of
the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs in August 1940.26 This new office was led by
young oil magnate and philanthropist Nelson Rockefeller, his official title being Coordinator for
Commercial and Cultural Relations. An executive order in 1941 renamed the agency as the
Office of the Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). Rockefeller developed commercial and cultural
projects in Latin America by creating libraries, cultural exchanges, and lecture programs.27 The
OIAA was the first U.S. agency to transmit American news and features abroad via shortwave

Radio Moscow to mark the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution with a series of
propaganda broadcasts. Prior to that, France had launched an official cultural program in 1923,
followed by fascist Italy’s first cultural institute overseas in 1926. When Hitler came to power in
1933, Germany spent substantial resources on cultural propaganda, to which England
responded with its own national cultural foundation The British Council in 1934. In such
circumstances, the United States needed to prepare for cultural diplomacy with its own
broadcasting avenues supporting a two-fold mission of domestic publicity for presidential
programs as well as overseas broadcasting.
25 Ibid., 11-12. More information on charge and mission of the initiative can be found in
University of Arkansas Special Collections, State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Relations (CU) archival documents; for scholarly analysis, see Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy
of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), 24-55; Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in
the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 49-74.
26 Ibid., 12.
27 Ibid.
11

radio.28 In 1941, with global warfare on the horizon, Roosevelt created the Office of the
Coordinator of Information for potential wartime information services and propaganda abroad;
the agency was led by war hero Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan.29 This new agency was
responsible for intelligence and special operations, including the Foreign Information Service
(FIS) led by Roosevelt's speechwriter Robert Sherwood. The FIS took an active role in
propaganda and information services abroad after the attack on Pearl Harbor, launching its first
international shortwave radio broadcast in Europe with the Voice of America (VOA) radio
station in December 1941.30 Soon afterwards, the U.S. officially declared its participation in the
Second World War, and VOA programs were replaced with wartime news services, which would
last through the end of the war.31 In spring of 1946, with wartime broadcasting coming to an
end, VOA programming returned to “information pertaining to American life, policy, industry,
techniques, culture, and customs” under growing ideological tension between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union.32 With the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 80-

28

Ibid., 13; The agency worked with U.S. commercial radio networks and Hollywood film
producers - Walt Disney being one - to develop “readymade programs” for Latin American
stations. This approach received mixed responses, with some criticizing American stations as
“bombastic” and “sugar coated” compared to the “honest, frank, and uncolored” European
radio stations. For more information on Rockefeller’s career with OIAA, see Cary Reich, The Life
of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958 (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 14. For an overview of the history of Voice of America and Cold War broadcasting, see
Robert William Pirsein, The Voice of America: A History of the International Broadcasting
Activities of the United States Government 1940-1962 (New York: Arno Press, 1979); Holly
Cowan Shulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
31 Ibid., 15-16.
32 Ibid., 31; Harry S. Truman Library, Charles M. Hulten papers, box 15, Voice of America 1946-7,
folders 1 and 3, Origins of International Broadcasting Activities of the U.S., Benton to Weiner et
al., Bracken to Benton, 28 March 1946.
12

402, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act) in place, the VOA continued its programming abroad
during peacetime under State Department jurisdiction.33 In 1954, the VOA was placed under
the administrative control of the newly-created USIA since the agency’s mission directly lined
up with programming already underway with VOA.34
Cultural programing under the State Department contributed to the resurgence of
mainstream jazz as an American art form, especially at a time when Bebop was the more
dominant jazz style.35 Popular magazines such as Down Beat, Life, and Esquire featured articles
on jazz as an art form, compared to its previous popularity as folk or dance music, and the
media continued to highlight the genre as an American invention, which later positioned jazz
well within U.S. cultural programming during the Cold War.36 To strike down Soviet propaganda

33

United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 80-402, 27
January 1948. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 permanently established the United States
propaganda campaign, including cultural exchange programs, to “promote a better
understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding
between the people of the United States and [other countries by disseminating] information
about the United States, its people, and its policies” through press, publications, radio, motion
pictures and other information media. The “interchange of developments in education, the
arts, and sciences” - cultural diplomacy - would fall under the “Educational Exchange”
component of the act. More information on the Act, its objectives, and definitions can be found
here: http://legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-402.pdf
34 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 90-91; Dwight E. Eisenhower
Presidential Library, President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, box 79, No.
91, International Affairs, 1953, memorandum for President Eisenhower, #14, Foreign Affairs
Organization, 9 April 1953. While the VOA was the official radio broadcasting service for the
U.S., other radio programs such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which were privatelyfunded and based in Europe but with a similar mission to VOA, were in operation at the time.
35 Iain Anderson, “The Resurgence of Jazz in the 1950s,” in This Is Our Music: Free Jazz, the
Sixties, and American Culture (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 11.
Anderson cites that Bebop musicians’ “risky” life style involving language, behavior, dress, and
recurring association with drugs led to a public misconception of “deviant outsiders,” which
was perhaps an image that the State Department was not willing to get behind.
36 Ibid., 10-11. Examples of jazz reception in print media include a Down Beat article titled “Jazz
Achieves Social Prestige” and a photo spread on Life magazine titled “ New Life for U.S. Jazz,”
13

of jazz as culturally “barbarous,” the State Department turned to jazz as a propaganda tool first
with radio and then with cultural programming abroad.37 The strategy was further supported by
President Harry S. Truman’s “Campaign of Truth,” which was announced in 1950, to mitigate
Soviet policy of “deceit, distortion, and lies” and improve and strengthen a range of
informational, educational, and cultural services as part of Cold War propaganda.38 For cultural
education of allies, enemies, and neutral newly-independent countries, the VOA, under the
State Department’s administration, featured a radio show titled Jazz Club USA from 1950-52,
which was hosted by jazz producer and broadcaster Leonard Feather.39 While the program only
lasted a couple of years, radio jazz had become immensely popular abroad drawing a large jazzloving audience all over the world. This success led to the creation of a regular jazz program on
VOA when the governance of the radio agency moved from the State Department to the USIA
in 1954. In 1955, a jazz radio program “aimed at Scandinavia but reaching the U.S.S.R” was
proposed, and Willis Conover was hired to be its resident disc jockey.40 Music U.S.A. Jazz Hour
premiered on 6 January 1955 with its opening theme of Duke Ellington’s “Take the A Train”

both in 1955, and a twenty page feature and photo special on Esquire titled “The Golden Age of
Jazz,” which was published a few years later.
37 Ibid., 11.
38 Harry S. Truman, ‘‘Going Forward with a Campaign of Truth,’’ Department of State Bulletin
22 (May 1, 1950): 669, 671. The Campaign of Truth affirmed U.S. foreign policy during the Cold
War, and acknowledged the importance of government programs to maintain allies and
influence neutral countries in America’s favor.
39 Anderson, “The Resurgence of Jazz in the 1950s,” 11. For more information on the career of
Leonard Feather, see “Music is Combating Communism: The Voice of America shows bring
Universal Harmony,” Down Beat, 8 October 1952; Leonard Feather, The Jazz Years: Eyewitness
to an Era (New York: Da Capo, 1987). For more information on Jazz Club USA and its playlist, see
http://otrrlibrary.org/OTRRLib/Library%20Files/J%20Series/Jazz%20Club%20USA/Jazz%20Club
%20USA%20-%20Tracklist.pdf
40 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 107.
14

followed by the voice of host and jazz expert Willis Conover. For the next forty years, Conover
hosted Music U.S.A. Jazz Hour six nights a week with 45 minutes of popular music followed by
45 minutes of jazz. In 1962, a New York Times article lauded Conover’s radio show for putting
jazz on the map and successfully spreading American values all over the world better than
broadcasting service had done to date.41
While the State Department and its agencies directly involved with propaganda and
information services were open with their cultural programming, some government officials
retreated to “covert” operations to keep originating agency and its intentions hidden from
foreign allies as well as enemies. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, covertly
carried out operations and funded cultural programs from 1950-1967, one of which was the
Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) headed by CIA agent Michael Josselson.42 Using news
services, print media, musical performances and competitions, touring art exhibitions,
international conferences, and cultural presentations, the CCF, with funding from CIA,
emphasized American culture to the “intellectual” Western world.43
As a parallel to CCF programming, the U.S. Cultural Presentations program formally
began as the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs in 1954, and came to a close
in the early 1970s due to shrinking budgets and a decreasing number of artists showing interest
in state-sponsored cultural diplomacy.44 The fund, first approved by Congress during President

41

Jack Gould, “Jazz on a Global Scale: Willis Conover Heard in Eighty Foreign Countries over
Radio Broadcasts by ‘Voice of America’ Network,” The New York Times (21 October 1962), 147.
42 Stoner Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 1.
43 Ibid., 2-3.
44 Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy (Oakland, CA: University of
California Press, 2015), 2.
15

Eisenhower’s administration, received an annual allocation of $2.25 million for musical and
dramatic presentations abroad and U.S. participation in international trade fairs.45 The program
received relatively steady funding through 1962, and a total of 206 cultural tours to 113
countries were recorded during the first eight years of the U.S. Cultural Presentations
program.46 The State Department collaborated with the American National Theater and
Academy (ANTA), a private organization promoting theatrical performances, to identify and
recruit artists for U.S. Cultural Presentations.47 The ANTA established advisory panels for music,
dance, and theater, with experts from each discipline, to recommend artists and provide
evaluations of candidates proposed for cultural diplomacy tours. Once performers and their
agents had expressed interest, each advisory panel met monthly to evaluate not only
performers to be sent on official tours but also musicians and other artists touring abroad
privately so that USIA field offices could be kept informed. ANTA’s Music Advisory Panel
members included composer and critic Virgil Thomson; composer and director of the Eastman
School of Music Howard Hanson; composer and director of the Juilliard School William
Schuman; violist and orchestral conductor Milton Katims; music critics Alfred Frankenstein (San
Francisco Chronicle), Jay Harrison (New York Herald Tribune), and Olin Downes (retired, New
York Times); prominent music librarians Carleton Sprague Smith (New York Public Library) and
Harold Spivacke (Library of Congress); musicologist and journalist Paul Henry Lang; and National
Music Council President Edwin Hughes.48
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Each advisory panel’s recommendations were reviewed by an inter-agency committee
made up of officials from the State Department, USIA, Defense Department, CIA, and other
cultural agencies.49 The State Department also solicited advice from a separate Advisory
Committee on the Arts (ACA), whose role was to advise state officials on the effectiveness of
the overall arts program. The ACA’s role was different from the advisory panels’ responsibilities
and the inter-agency committee’s role; the advisory panels evaluated specific performers and
their performance quality and behavior during tours abroad with a letter-grade based ranking
system, while the inter-agency committee was directly tasked with cultural propaganda
strategies for countries and regions that needed to be “cultivated” with American ideals and
cultural influences.50 The State Department, in return, was expected to produce annual reports
to Congress for continued fiscal and diplomatic support. Over time, officials in Washington
recognized the special power in the U.S. Cultural Presentations program connecting foreign
audiences with American culture through the arts.
For music programming, members of the ACA and the ANTA Music Advisory Panel were
drawn to art music for cultural diplomacy tours, crediting its appeal and recognition in Europe
and countries with a colonial past to draw large crowds. Many of these advisers were invested
in “high arts” as arts philanthropists, museum presidents, composers, and university professors,
with a bias towards art music as representative of an “educated and cultured” society.51 The
Music Advisory Panel had support from some State Department officials, who favored the tours
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to be demonstrative of “American artists [that] are in the very forefront of the world’s artistic
achievement.”52 The advisory panel evaluations were intended to identify and promote
American performers with originality and “greatness” in cultural diplomacy tours, but as
classical music experts, the Music Advisory Panel showed reluctance to include jazz artists,
claiming that they were not necessarily qualified to make recommendations for jazz and
popular music artists and groups. The State Department had received instructions from the
Eisenhower administration to include jazz artists in Cultural Presentations as jazz and African
American artists would help shape global perceptions of America’s race relations favorably.
Fosler-Lussier points out that indirectly tackling sensitive issues was a typical feature of cultural
diplomacy, and by programming African Americans jazz musicians and integrated bands in
cultural diplomacy tours would strategically put an end to domestic and foreign media coverage
of racial tension in the U.S.53 Members of the Music Advisory Panel were not as convinced;
Virgil Thomson stated during a monthly meeting that the only reason to support tours by jazz
musicians was because “the State Department boys have a mania for it.”54 This was one blatant
instance of marginalizing jazz and jazz artists in cultural programming. Eighty-three percent of
the groups approved by the ANTA Music Advisory Panel from 1954-63 were classical musicians
or music groups.55 Though jazz was the second most funded genre in Cultural Presentations,
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jazz ensembles “never made up more than a third of the groups approved in any given year.”56
Other reasons for marginalizing jazz in cultural presentations included its commercial quality
compared to “the great symphonies,” and perpetuating Soviet stereotypes of “low-brow” and
“market-driven” American culture with state-sponsored jazz tours. Advisory panelists tried to
warrant their decision to leave out jazz from Cultural Presentations by citing The Guide to
Cultural Presentations, a pamphlet delivered to field offices abroad; according to guidelines,
musicians must be capable of entertaining or “pleasing” mass audiences without making it their
sole purpose, and the performance must carry some form of artistic expression if the group was
leaning towards a popular music style.57
Having had no luck convincing the State Department against jazz in cultural diplomacy
tours, in 1955, the Music Advisory Panel recruited jazz critic and founder of the Institute of Jazz
Studies Marshall Stearns as a special consultant to assist with jazz programming, but there was
no direction toward recruiting an African American or a practicing jazz musician until a separate
subcommittee for folk and jazz music was formed in 1964.58 During the monthly meeting on 20
December 1955, Stearns proposed to include Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie,
Count Basie, and Stan Kenton and their bands in cultural diplomacy tours the following year.
Gillespie’s band was the de facto choice for the first State Department jazz tour because
Armstrong, Ellington, and Basie either had private tours in place or were not available to
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travel.59 The State Department promptly announced its decision to include African American
jazz artists in cultural diplomacy tours with a press conference on the steps of the House Office
Building; domestic and foreign media speculated the decision as “inclusive” propaganda in
response to the Brown vs. Board of Education decision of 1954 and the recent lynching of
Emmett Till in September 1955, both of which had attracted wide media coverage of
unfavorable race relations in the United States.60 The State Department argued, however, that
Gillespie’s band was the perfect representation of diverse and integrated American culture
comprising of “blacks, whites, males, females, Jews, and Gentiles.”61
Between 1956 and 1968, the State Department sponsored twenty-six cultural diplomacy
tours with jazz musicians (Table 1). 57% of the tours were led by African American musicians,
but four well-renowned African American jazz artists and their bands - Miles Davis, John
Coltrane, Charles Mingus, and Thelonious Monk - were notably left out from the tours. The
inter-agency committee made up of State Department officials had the final approval of artists
on tour, and often excluded artists and groups based on reports from field offices on how
artists may present themselves abroad, or due to a low score from the Music Advisory Panel
evaluations.62
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Table 1. State Department Jazz Tours, 1956-196863
Date
Group led by
Destination
1956 Mar 21 – May 21

Dizzy Gillespie

1956 July 26 – Aug 21
1956 Dec 6 – 1957 Jan 17

Dizzy Gillespie
Benny Goodman

1957 Mar 4 – May 17

Wilbur De Paris

1958 Mar 6 – May 9

Dave Brubeck

1958 Aug 10-31

Woody Herman

1958 Sep 26 – 1959 Jan 21

Jack Teagarden

1959 Dec 31 – 1960 Apr 5

Herbie Mann

1960 Jan 4 – Mar 30

Red Nichols

1960 Oct 25 – Dec 4

Louis Armstrong

1961 Jan 10-29
1961 Mar 12 – May 27

Louis Armstrong
Charlie Byrd

Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia,
United Arab Republic
Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil
Thailand, Singapore, Burma, Japan, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Cambodia
Africa: Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia,
Congo, Central African Republic, Kenya,
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia
Poland, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq
Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador,
Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Jamaica,
Honduras, Guatemala
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka,
Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia,
Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea,
Japan
Africa: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria,
Mozambique, Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Morocco, Tunisia
Greece, Turkey, Cypress, Palestine,
Jordan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,
Sri Lanka, Nepal, United Arab Republic,
Syria
Africa: Cameroon, Congo, Uganda, Kenya,
Tanzania, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Togo,
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Sudan
Egypt
Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay,
Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador,
Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
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Date

Group led by

Destination

1962 Feb 6 – July 13

Paul Winter

1962 May 30 – Jul 9
1962 May 31 – Jun 4
1962 Oct 15 – 1963 Mar 7

Benny Goodman
Louis Armstrong
Cozy Cole

1963 Sep 6 – Nov 22

Duke Ellington

1965 Sep 5-24
1966 Mar 31 – Apr 9
1966 Apr 1 – Jun 8

Paul Winter Sextet
Duke Ellington
Woody Herman

1966 Jul 7 – Aug 17
1967 Jan 16 – Apr 9

Earl Hines
Randy Weston

1967 Oct 12 – 22
1967 Nov 13 – 1968 Jan
20

Charles Lloyd
Junior Wells

1968 Apr 1 – May 26

Charlie Byrd

1968 Apr 29 – Jun 23

Charles Lloyd

Honduras
Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,
French West Indies, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Chile, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela
Soviet Union
Chile
Africa: Morocco, Senegal, Volta, Niger,
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo, Chad, Central
African Republic, Cameroon, Ghana,
Togo, Guinea
Near East, South Asia: Syria, Jordan,
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan
Brazil
Africa: Senegal
Africa: Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Ivory
Coast, Algeria; Yugoslavia, United Arab
Republic, Romani
Soviet Union
Africa: Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Niger,
Sierra Leone, Upper Volta; Lebanon,
Egypt
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania
Africa: Dahomey, Togo, Central African
Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, Guinea
Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines
Okinawa, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia,
Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines

While diplomacy has typically been associated with state officials in political or state-tostate negotiations, cultural diplomacy dealt with average citizens serving as amateur diplomats
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and goodwill ambassadors of American values and culture.64 Most musicians on cultural
diplomacy tours received in-person briefings or printed information from the State Department
prior to traveling abroad.65 Marshall Stearns, who had nominated Dizzy Gillespie’s band for the
first jazz tour, was requested by the State Department to accompany Gillespie not only to
deliver public lectures at foreign embassies but also “to keep an eye on Dizzy’s programs [to]
maintain the standards that have been set for [jazz musicians].”66 Band member Quincy Jones
recalled his interaction with an “arrogant and condescending” ANTA official,
He came to rehearsal and stood in front of the band in a pretty wool suit and bow
tie, and gave us advice in a flat, patronizing voice, saying, “I have nothing to tell
you except that when you’re abroad, you’re representing our country. So please
indulge in your various idiosyncrasies discreetly.”67
While first-time tour participants received careful instructions about locals and local sociopolitical conditions, high-profile musicians received minimal briefings or training before their
tours. For example, the only instructions Duke Ellington and company received prior to their
tour of Asia in 1963 was a single-spaced six-page document titled “Answering the Critic of the
United States Abroad.”68 The document provided suggestions for finding common ground with
a “foreign critic” by being calm and reasonable, answering with “yes, but,” and avoiding
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arguments with locals. The sub-section titled “Try to Get the Discussion out of an Exclusively
American Context” provided explicit instructions on how to derail conversations about U.S. race
relations with comments such as “it’s a universal problem for human beings all over the world,”
taking the emphasis away from the U.S. Ellington’s band member and jazz trombonist Buster
Cooper revealed in an interview that he received no instructions from the State Department,
which led to him speaking his mind freely about U.S. race relations during the tour; it may well
be that only the main artist, and not every band member, received official documents.69
One of the drawbacks of amateur diplomats is the difficulty in making them stick to a
script without preoccupations; in the case of college jazz musicians, they were often
preoccupied with rehearsals and performances more so than following official narrative and
agenda provided by the State Department. During the University of Michigan Jazz Band’s tour
of Latin America in 1965, the State Department supplied political briefings in the form of
pamphlets with titles such as “Democracy vs. Dictators” and “U.S. Policy toward Cuba.” The
pamphlets were distributed right before the tour in early January, and many students
complained that they did not have adequate time to read through material between winter
break and rehearsals in preparation of the tour.70 While critics of cultural diplomacy tours
questioned the State Department’s intent to recruit amateurs to represent the United States
abroad, State Department officials were confident that amateurs and student performance
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groups could lure foreign audiences with their “frankness in conversation” and “generosity in
sharing expertise,” showing evidence of American goodwill and “the excellence of the American
educational system.”71 State Department officials also favored the emphasis on youth in
programming, supporting many college-level jazz groups to travel as part of cultural diplomacy
tours. Sending student musicians, as seen in La Paz, Bolivia during the University of Michigan
Jazz Band tour, proved out to be an effective tool in building cultural relationships and forming
continued cultural exchange; the tour resulted in American and Bolivian students making
arrangements to form an educational exchange program with their institutions cultivating
continued cultural relations.72
By August 1958, jazz was established as a mainstay of cultural diplomacy; an Operations
Coordinating Board (OCB) report noted that “requests for jazz groups continue to be received”
from youth audiences abroad. Despite high cost of tours and decreasing financial support from
Congress, the State Department continued to support “one jazz group per area each year” as
part of Cultural Presentations.73 By the summer of 1959, the administration and funding of
diplomacy tours was placed under a new State Department agency: Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (CU).74
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The 1960s brought about many changes for civil rights, and the State Department
supported the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act with an increasing number of African
American jazz musicians on tour in addition to VOA programming including interviews of
African American musicians with a lively current affairs segment.75 1962 was a memorable year
for U.S.-Soviet relations as Benny Goodman became the first jazz musician to officially tour the
Soviet Union representing the State Department. Although the Khrushchev thaw was in place,
allowing artists from the West to travel to the Soviet Union, Soviets continued to wage a
campaign against “decadent western abstract art,” and Goodman was the ideal candidate to
represent the U.S. with his classical training behind jazz career.76 Due to locals protesting
against Goodman’s “out of date” style and increasing tension during the Cuban missile crisis,
which took place soon after Goodman’s tour, the Soviets did not accept another jazz tour until
1966, with Earl Hines and his band, followed by Duke Ellington and his orchestra in 1971.77
The impact of American jazz and jazz musicians was evident in artist memoirs and
official correspondences from field offices throughout the course of the jazz diplomacy tours. In
a 2011 interview with Monk Rowe, Iola Brubeck recalled her observations of jazz-loving
audiences during Dave Brubeck’s 1958 state department tour,
In Poland, jazz just became this symbol of the freedom that they wanted and were
seeking, and so it was an underground movement that for some time was
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forbidden. And by the time, in 1958, when the quartet went there, it had loosened
up a little bit so there could be jazz societies.78
The State Department’s eagerness to frame jazz as representative of American values
and the use of African American jazz musicians and integrated bands as representative of racial
harmony and equality contributed to the success of U.S. cultural diplomacy. State Department
cultural diplomacy tours helped to institutionalize jazz and include the genre in the American
arts canon. Whether or not American jazz musicians “intended to subvert” their government,
their actions and message of goodwill supported the image that the State Department desired
to project cultural diplomacy tours.

78

Monk Rowe, Oral History Interview with Iola Brubeck, Fillius Jazz Archives Interviews,
Hamilton College Library (July 17, 2011), 2.
27

CHAPTER 3
Race Relations and United States Cultural Diplomacy during the 1950s-60s

And If [God] cared if you’re black or white,
He’d mixed one color, one just right.
When will that great day come / when everyone is one
[And] God tells Man he’s really free.
Louis Armstrong, The Real Ambassadors
"They say I look like God"

United States cultural propaganda during the Cold War aimed to showcase mainstream
jazz and African American artists as proof of improving race relations and status in American
life, but the same propaganda failed to deceive international audiences at times, much to the
surprise of government officials. Jazz diplomacy under state sponsorship began as a result of
progress in the civil rights movement, beginning with the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of
Education decision in 1954 ending the separate-but-equal doctrine.79 The Brown decision
marked a victory for African Americans, and in response to this civil rights landmark event, the
Eisenhower administration included African Americans in cultural diplomacy to articulate a
narrative of racial progress.80 With racial equality as a goal, the State Department and USIA
increased African American representation in cultural diplomacy tours as a strategy to mitigate
international criticism of domestic racial issues.81
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While African American goodwill ambassadors such as Louis Armstrong and Dizzy
Gillespie were spreading American ideals of freedom and democracy abroad during cultural
diplomacy tours, racial tension and isolated incidents of segregation were very much the reality
(and still continue to be!) for African Americans fighting for equality. On 4 September 1957, a
major civil rights event challenged the United States portrayal of racial equality and democracy
in the eyes of the world, when nine African American high school students attempting to enroll
at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas were prevented from entering the school
premises by order of Arkansas governor Orval Faubus.82 Faubus’ orders directly violated the
1954 Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision to end school segregation starting
with the 1957-58 school year.83 As the crisis deepened with protests and rallies, domestic and
international media coverage of the event also increased. President Eisenhower and his
administration got involved with the crisis by deploying the Federal National Guard to Little
Rock to escort the Little Rock Nine into the high school. Newspapers around the world covered
the incident with images of African American children next to federal troops holding loaded
rifles (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Armed troops escort African American students into Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1957.84

In an interview with the Arkansas Gazette, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
condemned domestic media for inaccurately portraying events and claimed that these
“desegregation battles” were not helpful for the United States image abroad, especially since
Radio Moscow had been “chirping happily about the troubles of integration.”85 Coverage of the
1957 Little Rock Crisis became a highlight for international media from The London Times, to
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the Times of India, the South China Morning Post and other media outlets carrying updates on
the story for the entire month of September. According to the U.S. field office in Brussels, the
story received great interest among the Belgian press “far greater than any other American
domestic issue in recent years.”86 While the media criticized Eisenhower’s delayed action to
respond to the crisis, the State Department came up with a propaganda document to
disseminate to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and field offices abroad outlining
strategies for responding to international criticism.87
The white paper titled “Talking Points to Overcome Adverse Reactions to Little Rock
Incident” emphasized that the process of school desegregation in most states had not been as
contentious as in Little Rock, Arkansas, and talking points covered “marked progress toward
integration” and “tremendous strides” being made in removing racial barriers in the U.S.88 The
document also stressed that there was “growth in homeownership and rising income levels
among non-whites,” pointing to economic improvements in the lives of African Americans.89
This was not the only instance the State Department commented on African Americans quality
of life. In November 1957, after Secretary of Labor James Mitchell sent Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles a copy of his article “The Negro Moves Up,” which was due for publication in the
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December 1957 issue of the Reader’s Digest, Dulles responded that “this comprehensive report
with its impressive background of statistical facts should clear up a lot of misunderstanding
overseas.”90
The final paragraph of the “Talking Points” document provided a revealing glimpse into
the concerns of the authors of the document:
In the United States, national authority is being used not to suppress individual
equality and freedom but to uphold them. In the Little Rock incident national
authority was invoked to maintain [the] equal rights of a minority. In the Soviet
Union national authority has been repeatedly invoked to suppress the rights of
minorities.91
According to U.S. Foreign Policy historian Cary Fraser, this concluding statement clarifies the
need to avoid parallels being drawn between Soviet policies and the U.S. government’s actions
in the aftermath of the 1957 Little Rock Crisis.92 To continue portraying a positive and unified
image of the United States abroad (and also for damage control purposes), the USIA distributed
pictures of integrated schools and accomplishments of African Americans to field offices as part
of information services propaganda.93 Despite the public relations “hiccup” during the 1957
Little Rock Crisis, the State Department continued its cultural diplomacy efforts with an
emphasis on “Americana” themed activities with funding support from private foundations
such as the Ford Foundation. This new funding model helped to create American studies
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programs in European universities and create and fund American Studies faculty positions and
exchange programs with American academic institutions.94
At the turn of the century, African American activist and intellectual W.E.B Du Bois
predicted that the politics surrounding race in the United States - “the color line, the relation of
the darker to the lighter races of men” - would drive domestic and foreign policy decisions
during the 20th century.95 The 1957 Little Rock Crisis was an apt illustration of Du Bois’s
prediction, but was not the first occasion where policy decisions were made as a result of racial
tension in the U.S. In the fall of 1946, during the United National (UN) General Assembly in New
York City, a foreign policy crisis nearly erupted due to several New York hotels refusing to
accommodate UN delegations from Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia due to Jim Crow segregation. 96
The U.S. Ambassador to the UN had to intervene by meeting with the hotel board, who agreed
to accept the African delegates but not the Haitians. In the end, the State Department had to
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secure accommodation for the Haitians and prevent the scandal from being publicized in local
and international media.97
While the 1957 Little Rock Crisis would become a defining moment in American foreign
policy, it was not the first civil rights event during Eisenhower’s presidency to gain international
attention. The world watched the verdict in the brutal murder of Emmett Till in October 1955,
with international media weighing in. The field office in Paris, France reported to the State
Department that the French media were giving “wide coverage to the Till case, vociferously
condemning the verdict.”98 An all-white jury in Mississippi had acquitted the accused murderers
of Till, an African American teenager from Chicago who had supposedly whistled and touched a
white woman.99 A few months later, in early 1956, the field office in Copenhagen, Denmark
reported to the State Department that the case of Autherine Lucy, a young African American
woman who was denied admission into the University of Alabama, had gained attention from
the Danish press and local university officials. Field officials also reported that the
administration and students from two Danish universities (Copenhagen and Aarhus), with
support from a local paper, had telegraphed their support and sympathy to Miss Lucy, and had
even offered financial assistance for her to complete studies at the University of Copenhagen.
The State Department officials blamed domestic media coverage for exacerbating the situation
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and damaging the American image after “such tragedies as the Emmett Till case and the
unfortunate riots attending Miss Lucy’s efforts.”100 The State Department continued to
disseminate propaganda documents as official statements for field mission offices abroad in the
wake of international media coverage of U.S. civil rights events such as the Emmett Till verdict
in 1955, Montgomery bus boycott in 1955-56, and Autherine Lucy’s denial of admission in 1956.
However, African Americans involved with cultural diplomacy tours faced a difficult position in
continuing to represent the State Department and American values while experiencing racial
injustices and discrimination at home.
Louis Armstrong was perhaps the most prominent African American jazz musician
repeatedly requested to travel abroad as part of the State Department cultural diplomacy
tours. Armstrong, who rarely spoke out about racial issues, was vocal during the aftermath of
the 1957 Little Rock Crisis and called off his imminent State Department tour to the Soviet
Union. On 19 September 1957, the New York Times reported the news with the headline: “Louis
Armstrong, Barring Soviet Tour, Denounces Eisenhower and Gov. Faubus.” In the article,
Armstrong declared, “the way they are treating my people in the South, the government can go
to hell... It’s getting almost so bad a colored man hasn’t got any country.”101 A few days later,
Armstrong remarked in a Pittsburgh Courier article:
I wouldn’t take back a thing I’ve said. I’ve had a beautiful life over forty years in
music, but I feel the downtrodden situation the same as any other Negro. My
parents and family suffered through all of that Old South… My people, the
Negroes, are not looking for anything. We just want a square shake. But when I
see on television and read about a crowd spitting on and cursing at a little colored
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girl, I think I have a right to get sore and say something about it. After all, America
is my country, too, and I’ve always tried to do anything I could to help it.102
Armstrong also criticized President Eisenhower for being “two-faced [and] allowing the
Governor of Arkansas to run the Federal government.” As for Faubus, Armstrong called his
actions “a publicity stunt by the greatest of all publicity hounds.”103
In multiple interviews, Armstrong repeatedly stated that the goodwill tours should
target American audiences before reaching out to Communist regions. That sentiment later
made its way into one of the songs in the musical The Real Ambassadors: “Look here, what we
need is a goodwill tour of Mississippi. Forget Moscow, when do we play New Orleans?”104 As an
example corroborating Armstrong’s comments, Dizzy Gillespie and his band was the first jazz
group and integrated band to travel abroad representing the State Department tours, but his
band would not have been welcomed in Athens, Georgia despite success in Athens, Greece. It
was far from amusing to African Americans such as Dizzy Gillespie to represent America’s
freedom abroad while they continued to live in a segregated society at home. In his
autobiography-biography, Gillespie recalled his response to State Department propaganda
reinforcing equal opportunities for all Americans: “I sort’ve liked the idea of representing
America, but I wasn’t going to apologize for the racist policies.”105 Gillespie purposely avoided
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his pre-tour briefing stating that “he’s got three hundred years of briefing,” as a reference to
African American history of racial oppression, and did not hesitate to promote his own version
of America while on tour.106 Needless to say, the State Department did not appreciate
Gillespie’s off-scripted comments on race and U.S. foreign policy. It would take another
eighteen years before Gillespie was invited to travel abroad for his second jazz diplomacy
tour.107
The 1957 Little Rock Crisis also created a chain of events in the U.S. and abroad limiting
opportunities for African American musicians to continue in Cultural Presentations. From 1957
to 1960, State Department officials showed reluctance to send all-Black jazz groups on tour, and
opted for integrated and all-White bands to travel abroad representing the State Department.
Further proof can be found in correspondence from field offices; an official from Rio, Brazil
requested Woody Herman’s band, while the field office in Czechoslovakia pointed to the
popularity of the Dave Brubeck Quartet.108 In Poland, Edward A. Symans, attaché in Warsaw,
argued that a White jazz group “would rekindle waning sentiments and strongly reinforce
relationships still alive.”109 As far Africa, numerous requests were made from field offices in
Senegal and Congo proposing Louis Armstrong for the next State Department jazz tour. Due to
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Armstrong’s recent dissent against the Eisenhower administration, the State Department
decided to send Dave Brubeck and band on a tour of Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in
1958.110 Brubeck’s quartet had been recently integrated with African American bass player
Eugene Wright with the remaining three members being White (Brubeck on piano, Paul
Desmond on alto saxophone, Joe Morello on drums); this may have increased the group’s
eligibility to represent the State Department as an integrated band.
Brubeck was a surprising choice for the 1958 tour as his style was identified in a Time
magazine article from November 1954 as West Coast modern jazz with growing popularity and
profitability. The article described Brubeck as a “new kind of jazz artist” for his intellectualism
and commitment to a family life.111 A combination of originality and artistry together with
growing media attention made Dave Brubeck and his band the ideal candidate to represent
American culture appealing to “high culture” audiences in Eastern Europe.112 While Brubeck
had a successful cultural diplomacy tour abroad, his quartet had difficulty scheduling
performances at universities in the South because of the band’s integrated nature. For
example, the University of Georgia’s policy for visiting integrated groups requested that Black
members be replaced with White members, which Brubeck refused to do; in doing so, the band
reportedly lost forty-thousand dollars during the entire tour season.113 For Brubeck, the choice
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presented to him and his band was “unconstitutional” and “ridiculous,” and the quartet’s White
members demanded that university authorities modify policy to allow integrated groups to
“play music without intimidation or pressure.”114 Gene Wright added, “It’s a shame we can go
travel all over the world and not have problems, and some have such a ‘silly problem’.”115
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CHAPTER 4
The Real Ambassadors

The Real Ambassador is a story about jazz and jazz musicians in the context of cultural
exchange and race relations in the United States during the 1950s. The co-creators of the
musical, Dave Brubeck and wife Iola, drew on theirs and others' experiences from touring the
world in 1958, on behalf of the U.S. State Department. The scholarly and serious Brubeck was
starting to be recognized as an important jazz composer, pianist, and leader of the highlyacclaimed Dave Brubeck Quartet. His wife Iola was an actress, poet, and writer.116
The Brubecks, alongside Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, Duke Ellington, and others,
were part of the official State Department tours to spread American culture and arts during the
early Cold War years. The primary mission of cultural diplomacy jazz tours were to reach
countries whose allegiances were not well defined, or who were at risk of aligning with the
Soviet Union. As the title of the musical states, The Real Ambassadors was about the role these
jazz musicians played as cultural ambassadors for their country. Among actual events
referenced directly or indirectly in the musical are Greek student riots outside the U.S. Embassy
in Greece and their resolution during Dizzy Gillespie’s 1956 State Department tour, and
Armstrong calling off his official State Department tour to the Soviet Union as a result of the
Eisenhower administration’s handling of the 1957 Central High School Crisis in Little Rock,
Arkansas.
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The librettist of the musical, Iola Brubeck, once stated, “Dave [Brubeck] says The Real
Ambassadors is a Broadway version of a jazz show,” referring to the true emotional quality of
jazz and ironic wit in Broadway portrayed in the musical.117 Iola began working on the libretto
shortly after Dizzy Gillespie and his band returned from the first State Department jazz tour in
1956, but much of the lyrics were completed after accompanying her husband Dave and his
band during the State Department tour in 1958.118 Jazz was finally receiving its long-overdue
recognition with federal funding, leading to the possibility to a musical highlighting a cultural
exchange tour and associated racial and societal issues. After five years of "writing, rewriting,
and waiting", the first rehearsal and five subsequent recording sessions in 1961 led to a cast
album of musical selections under Brubeck’s own label Columbia Records (COL CL 5850), which
was released in 1962.119 In 1994, song selections from the LP cast album were re-released with
the same album title, by Sony Music Entertainment on the Columbia/Legacy label (CK 57663).
The 1962 original cast album was produced by Teo Macero, and performers included
The Dave Brubeck Trio (Brubeck on piano, bassist Eugene Wright, drummer Joe Morello), Louis
Armstrong and his band (including trombonist Trummy Young, pianist Billy Kyle, clarinetist Joe
Darensbourg, Willy Kronk, and drummer Danny Barcelona), vocal trio Lambert-Hendricks-Ross,
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and jazz vocalist Carman McRae.120 The libretto with fifteen songs and related narration from
The Real Ambassadors was printed in 1963 and published by Hansen Publications. Iola
recognized Louis Armstrong as the perfect candidate to play the lead role:
His horn [was] his crown and scepter... Anyone who has been caught in Louis'
spell can really believe that if he were to blast three times 'round, the walls
of hate would come tumbling down!121
This statement comes directly from the lyrics of the song Blow, Satchmo, where Armstrong's
horn, compared to the biblical story of Joshua's horn bringing down the walls of Jericho, would
lead those fighting for racial equality "to that promised land."122 In her commentary
accompanying cast album recording, Iola also reminisced about the choice of company singers
and musicians that would be featured in the musical:
Carmen McRae was our immediate choice to play opposite Louis... Obviously,
no vocal group but Lambert-Hendricks-Ross could manage to sound like a
crowd or a full chorus on demand.123
The musical’s first public performance was in the form of a revue of ten tunes at the
Monterey Jazz Festival in 1962, with Iola Brubeck in the narrator role and the album cast
(except Annie Ross, who was replaced by Yolande Bavan).124 Brubeck commented on the
performance’s reviews,
[Ralph] Gleason and [Leonard] Feather weren’t [always] kind to me, [but] they
flipped over it. They had tears in their eyes after the concert, and said they felt it
was the greatest thing ever done at Monterey. The most critical jazz audience in
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the world rose as one body to give Louis Armstrong and the cast a standing
ovation. It was an electrifying moment.125
While the musical was written as a Broadway show, it never made to Broadway. During a 2007
interview with Shan Sutton, Head of Special Collection and Curator of the Brubeck Oral History
Project at University of the Pacific Library, Dave and Iola Brubeck cited the cost of production
and race relations at the time as reasons for why the musical was never performed in full in a
commercial venue. Iola specifically credited the Brubecks’ (and Louis Armstrong's) manager Joe
Glaser’s opinion of concert tours being more lucrative than time and production cost spent for
a Broadway show. As for race relations, both Iola and Dave stressed that the emphasis on racial
issues and government criticism were possible reasons for no producers stepping up to
promote the show beyond its premiere.126
In 2002, the musical returned to the Monterey Jazz Festival to celebrate its 40th
anniversary with the Dave Brubeck Quartet (now saxophonist Bobby Militello, Brubeck on
piano, bassist Michael Moore, and drummer Randy Jones), jazz singer Lizz Wright, Roy Hargrove
and Byron Stripling on trumpet, Christian McBride on bass, Chris Brubeck on trombone, and
vocalists Lynne Fiddmont, Lamont VanHook, and Fred White.127 Selections from the musical
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returned to the stage again in April 2014 for its first performance in New York City as part of the
Jazz at Lincoln Center series, this time featuring Yolande Bavan in the role of narrator.128
The Real Ambassadors contains ballads, jump tunes, and patter songs, offering a variety
in its musical content within the jazz style. The musical is in many ways a tribute to Louis
Armstrong for taking a stance during the 1957 Central High School Crisis. Iola later recalled,
“[When] we got into this project we really didn’t know Louis that well, but we sensed in him a
depth and an unstated feeling we thought we could tap into, without being patronizing, and I
think that’s why he took [the role].129 Casting Armstrong as the musical’s hero and leading star
was the Brubecks' way of recognizing his impact on foreign audiences as a jazz and goodwill
ambassador. Iola intended for the libretto to satirize State Department objectives, personnel,
and protocol, and voice “an unequivocal indictment of Jim Crow America.”130 For Armstrong,
however, some of the song selections presented an opportunity to address many of the racial
issues he had struggled with throughout his career. The song They Say I Look Like God had a
particular effect on Armstrong, as Dave Brubeck recalled in a 2009 interview:
Now, we wanted the audience to chuckle about the ridiculousness of segregation
but Louis was crying… and every time we wanted Louis to loosen up, he'd sing,
'I'm really free. Thank God Almighty, I'm really free.' It was too emotional.131
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The Real Ambassadors is set in a fictional and newly-independent African country called
Talgalla, and the hero's story mirrors Louis Armstrong's career and reception as a jazz
ambassador. The hero, played by Armstrong, has just arrived with his band, bringing jazz music
to win friends abroad for the United States. Here, Talgalla’s portrayal satirizes the political
motives behind State Department tours in Africa:
It had been unknown and unrecognized as a nation until the two great
superpowers simultaneously discovered its existence. Suddenly, Talgalla was a
nation to be reckoned with. The Russian techniques build the empty road that lay
below them. U.S. equipment had cleared the airfield.132
On the one hand, Talgalla is pictured as a product of superpower rivalries, yet it is also a place
where a new social order can be ushered in as “a symbol of democratic and utopian
aspiration.”133
Returning to the narrative of the musical, Armstrong is made king for the day, and he
promises to establish a pendulum in the town square to remind people that the world still
swings. The meaning of the latter expression could mean literally swinging to jazz music, or
metaphorically that the world is neither good nor evil, and each country swings like a pendulum
between the two ends. In between musical selections, a narrator ties together the threads of
the story, and the vocal group, like a chorus in opera or musical theater, provides commentary
on events that do not take place on stage.
The political and satirical tone of the musical is established by the narrator's opening
comments, which describe the musical as neither drama nor play, but a means of “pretending”
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to raise many voices as one.134 In the absence of scenery or costumes, except when props assist
singers for plot advancement, the narrator opens the musical with an invitation to imagine "an
African village with a church and a palace and people in its streets" as the backdrop to the
musical. The opening number Ev’rybody's Comin' introduces the cast members and musicians
by name as they enter the stage on cue. The narrator's comments lead to the next number, and
introduce the purpose of the musical:
[The hero] had no political message, no slogan, no plan to sell or save the world.
Yet he, and other traveling musicians like him, had inadvertently served a national
purpose, which officials recognized and eventually sanctioned with a program
called Cultural Exchange.135
In the song Cultural Exchange, the chorus and the hero recall a news account of Dizzy
Gillespie putting an end to riots in Greece during his 1956 State Department tour, and
acknowledges Gillespie’s success as the reason for continued support from the State
Department for jazz musicians to be represented in cultural diplomacy tours.136
Yeah! I remember when Diz was in Greece back in ’56.
He did such a good job we started sending jazz all over the world…
No commodity is quite so strange / as this thing called Cultural Exchange.137
The line “No commodity is quite so strange, as this thing called cultural exchange” can only be
fully appreciated in the context of Brubeck and Armstrong tours. Both artists and their bands
were “deliberately sent into the front lines of a major foreign policy crisis” as official
representatives of the State Department.138 After a 120-day long tour of Asia and Eastern
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Europe, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “unilaterally cancelled” Brubeck’s U.S.
engagements and extended his 1958 tour to include Iran and Iraq in the midst of the Middle
East oil crisis of 1958.139
Iola captures the satire in Cultural Exchange with the line "Say that our prestige needs a
tonic, export The Philharmonic," (p. 13-14) as a reminder of the U.S. State Department delaying
to include jazz in its official cultural presentations.140 Another jab at sour race relations between
government officials and African American musicians come out in the line, "And when all our
neighbors called us vermin, we sent out Woody Herman," (p.14) referring to the White band
leader and his group that toured Europe while African American groups were restricted from
official travel.141 The song continues to highlight white musicians and/or their music that had
long represented the State Department:
Gershwin gave the Muscovites a thrill (with Porgy and Bess).
Bernstein was the darling of Brazil.
And just to stop internal mayhem, we dispatched [dancer] Martha Graham.
while African Americans and integrated bands did not receive official representation until
1956.142 Cultural Exchange encapsulates the controversial and complicated history between
jazz, African Americans, and the State Department with:
The State Department has discovered jazz. It reaches folks like nothin' ever has.
Like when they feel that jazzy rhythm, they know we're really with 'em.
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That's what we call cultural exchange.143
The essence of cultural diplomacy is best captured in this sarcastic tag that appears towards the
end of the song, which came about as an improvisation by Armstrong during a recording
rehearsal with his band: “And if the world goes really wacky / We'll get John [Kennedy] to send
out Jackie," at which point trombonist Trummy Young interrupted, "You mean Jackie
Robinson?", to which Armstrong responded, "No, man, I mean the First Lady / That's what we
call cultural exchange."144 The narrator’s comment closing the song draws a parallel to
Armstrong’s delayed acceptance of an invitation to travel as part of the State Department
cultural diplomacy tours: “He, who had experienced such great success as an unofficial
ambassador, felt that [an official] tour could jeopardize his spotless, non-committal career.”145
The song Remember Who You Are captures much of the sarcasm and satire in the
musical, and recalls the briefings given to Dave Brubeck and his band at the airport shortly
before leaving for the 1958 State Department tour:
When you travel in a far off land,
Remember you're more than just a band
You represent the U.S.A.,
So watch what you think and do and say
Remember who you are and what you represent...
Always be a credit to your government.
No matter what you say or what you do,
The eyes of the world are watching you.
Never face a problem, always circumvent
Stay away from issues. Be discreet,
When controversy enters, you retreat.146
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While briefings were focused on preventing “potentially embarrassing behavior,” the musicians
were given little warning on how to respond to turbulent politics and criticism of American
domestic policy.147 The song Remember who you are also pays homage to jazz pioneers Jelly
Roll Morton and Count Basie – “Jelly Roll and Basie helped us to invent” (p.22) - but perhaps the
most chilling expression in the entire song is Iola’s characterization of jazz as Cold War arsenal –
“a weapon that no other nation has, especially the Russians can't claim jazz” (p.23) – for the
closing words of the song.148
In King for a Day, Armstrong and Young daydream about the things they would do if
Armstrong was appointed king for a day. When Armstrong announced that he would call a
“basement session.” Young interjects with, "Pops, you mean a summit conference?" to which
Armstrong replies, "Man, I don't mean a U.N. kind-of session, I mean a jam session." He goes
onto say that he would:
Form a swingin' band with all the leaders from every land.
Why, they will fall right in a swingin' groove and all the “isms” gonna move.
Relationship is bound to improve.149
One of the “isms” implied here may be communism, which the United States perceived as the
biggest threat against the world during the Cold War years. Young objects to Armstrong’s
idealistic words with:
How can they all agree on one melody? Won’t each man call his own tune?
They will want the song they’ve played all along.
You’re expecting too much too soon.
Although my king is wise, Can't he realize / Rome wasn't built in a day
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Won't a diplomat just be apt to scat in a “hippy”-critical way?150
Armstrong replies,
Not if they are playin' jazz. They'll be no such razzmatazz.
’Cause it's a session where we jam the blues.
Khrushchev poundin' both his shoes couldn’t have the final say,
If I'm king for a day.151
The song clearly captures the political context in which jazz tours took place and the impact
that cultural diplomats could make in the absence of effort from political diplomats. What is
particularly interesting is the reference to Nikita Khrushchev, Russian prime minister during the
height of the Cold War 1958-1964, and his shoe-banging incident during the United Nations
General Assembly in New York City in 1960.152 King for a Day is the only musical example that
directly references the U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. The song also pays homage to
“kings” or pioneers of jazz such as Buddy Bolden (who was called the King of Black New Orleans
music), King Oliver (hot jazz pioneer), Count Basie, Duke Ellington, and Earl “Fatha” Hines.153
The punch line of the entire musical is revealed in the title song The Real Ambassadors,
when the chorus, pretending to be diplomatic ambassadors following instructions verbatim,
asks the hero who the real ambassador is:
It is evident we represent American society
Noted for its etiquette, its manners and sobriety
We have followed protocol with absolute propriety.154
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The lyrics capture the sarcasm behind state officials being reluctant to include jazz musicians on
grounds of alleged rebellious nature and improper conduct, often to do with night life and
clubs.155 The chorus continues to describe the power and prestige carried by political diplomats
with endorsement from public media (“NBC and CBS”), “Senators and Congressmen,” and the
State Department itself. Fortunately, Armstrong steps in and clears up any confusion, but by
doing so he challenges the “legitimacy of government policy” and asserts self-imposed
authority.156
I'm the real ambassador.
It is evident that I wasn't sent by government to take your place
All I do is play the blues and meet the people face to face
I'll explain and make it plain /
I represent the human race and don't pretend no more…
In my humble way, I'm the U.S.A.
Though I represent the government,
The government don't represent some policies I'm for.
Oh, we’ve learned to be concerned about the constitutionality
In our nation segregation isn't a legality
Soon our only diff’rences will be in personality
That's what I stand for.157
The lyrics here are especially personal to Armstrong’s response denouncing President
Eisenhower and his administration over the handling of the 1957 Central High School Crisis in
Little Rock, Arkansas. This was the only instance where Armstrong openly stated his personal
views on racial inequality and segregation in a political context.
The storyline continues with a street festival held in Talgalla to welcome the musicians
and diplomats visiting the newly-independent country. The tone of the musical takes a dark
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turn as the hero reflects on his role as a goodwill ambassador and an image of reverence. The
song They say I look like God is presented as an antiphonal Blues between Armstrong and the
vocal trio Dave Lambert, Jon Hendricks, and Annie Ross chanting a biblical text.158 In an audio
letter, Iola explains to Armstrong the scene in which the song occur:
You have just been publicly shamed by the real Ambassador, who thinks that you
have falsely claimed to be an Ambassador of the United States. The people, who
had hailed you as a hero, sadly turn away from you because they have seen the
real Ambassador seems to wield more power than you... You feel your idealistic
dreams for helping the world has completely crumbled. You feel complete and
absolute humility... From within the church you hear the chant of priests: 'God
created Man in his image and likeness. In the image of God, created He them.
Beloved, let us love one another for lovers of God. He that loveth God loveth his
brother also.'159
While the song The Real Ambassadors may seem to be the title song, They say I look like God
states the real purpose of the musical exposing racial equality and humanity regardless of color
of skin and place of birth. The song emulates a religious feeling similar to a traditional spiritual:
Oh, Lord, please hear my plea! Oh give me eyes to see
That our Creation was meant to be An Act of God to set man free…
When will that great day come? When everyone is One
And there will be no more misery When God tells man he's really free.160
The story ends on an upbeat tone (pun intended!) as the people of Talgalla take to the
streets to dance and celebrate the hero, Armstrong, being crowned King of Talgalla. Armstrong,
in the role of the hero and “the real ambassador”, is celebrated as a symbol of hope for peace,
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freedom, and human dignity in the Finale: “This day we’re free! We’re equal in ev’ry way.” 161
Iola Brubeck explains the significance of lyrics in this final coronation scene:
The priests from the mission, standing on the church steps, sing their plea, which
are quotations from the bible - 'Cry loud! Spare not! Lift up thy voice like a
trumpet' [p.70] - because the priests have seen your effect on the people and they
want you to stay there and lead them. The crowd want you to blow your horn, the
symbol of freedom.162
The finale continues with the chorus, representing the crowds, singing "Blow, Satchmo! Make
that trumpet roar" (p.70) and "Can you hear us... talkin' to you. Good Lord, set us free" (p.74).
The only ones who are "almost without hope," according to Iola's audio letter, are the workers
in the street singing the spiritual: "Been waitin' so long, Lord! How long will it be?" (p.76). 163
The finale ends with Satchmo picking up his horn of freedom and everyone dancing and singing
with the hero as the king leads them to "that promised land."164
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion

State Department officials expected for cultural diplomacy to be eagerly accepted
abroad due to their nature of reaching global audiences with American values and culture.
However, much of global reception of American ideals and cultural diplomacy propaganda
during the Cold War were effected by U.S. domestic and foreign policy issues. Eisenhower’s
administration built on the initiatives set in place during the Truman administration to elevate
cultural diplomacy using Federal funding. American arts and culture, especially jazz, received
international level acclaim as a result of investment and support from federal agencies such as
the USIA and the State Department. This cultural “high” continued into the Kennedy
administration with the creation of the Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs at the
Department of State. In the 1970s, the USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs brought back emphasis into American studies, once again disseminating
American culture around the world.165 While the Berlin Wall didn’t come down to the blowing
of Satchmo’s trumpet, the immense contributions made by jazz artists via radio and diplomacy
tours did more for the United States to win the cultural Cold War than any politician or
government official.
James Der Derian defined diplomacy as “a mediation between estranged individuals,
groups, or entities. Mediation, in this context, is defined as a connecting link or an
intervention.166 Utilizing music, especially jazz, and associated cultural exchanges (such as jam
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sessions) were a successful measure to build cultural relationships during the Cold War. This
provided an opportunity for musicians to be involved in global relationship building as cultural
ambassadors and allowed average citizens to share American values and ideals in a global
setting. Throughout this thesis, the question I have considered here is to what extent did jazz
succeed in being recognized as an American strength beyond Cold War cultural propaganda?
While cultural diplomacy tours exemplified jazz as an American treasure around the world, they
failed to create the same effect among domestic audiences at the same time and in the years to
come.
As Fosler-Lussier points out, while music did not have the capacity to break down
political borders and distrust during the Cold War, jazz as an American invention transcended
political action in helping America win the cultural Cold War.167 The argument that jazz was
improving race relations within the United States was often crosscut with political propaganda.
In some instances, the mere presence and representation of African Americans in the State
Department jazz tours was enough to convey a strong positive message of racial equality. For
the musicians who participated in the State Department tours, engagement with audiences
created a sense of purpose in representing American culture and music, and the State
Department’s eagerness to include jazz for cultural diplomacy helped to institutionalize jazz and
create a fan base at home. The issue of racial equality accomplished during the cultural
diplomacy tours is still somewhat unresolved. African America artists who openly discussed
struggles and observations during tours used their public image as goodwill ambassadors to
advance not only the interests of their government but also their race. A balance between

167

Ibid., 22.
55

critical outspokenness and patriotic discretion were necessary and appropriate for advancing
the cause of African Americans seeking racial equality and freedom during the Cold War.
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